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Note
Deterring Fraud to Increase Public Confidence:
Why Congress Should Allow Government
Employees to File Qui Tam Lawsuits
Barry M. Landy*
Six-hundred-dollar toilet seats, $748 pliers, and $7000 cof-
feepots are outrageous expenditures for most individuals-but
they are inexplicable outlays for the federal government.'
These expenses are only examples of costs that contractors
have fraudulently charged to the government and ultimately
the American taxpayer.2 Fraud accounts for an estimated loss
of up to ten percent of the entire U.S. federal budget. 3 In 2008,
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patience on each draft of this Note and throughout law school. Finally, the au-
thor thanks his parents, Bryan and Robin, and his sister, Erin, for their un-
conditional love and support. Copyright C 2010 by Barry M. Landy.
1. See Lisa Estrada, Note, An Assessment of Qui Tam Suits by Corporate
Counsel Under the False Claims Act: United States ex rel. Doe v. X Corp., 7
GEO. MASON L. REV. 163, 166 (1998); Robert E. Johnston, Note, 1001 Attorneys
General: Executive-Employee Qui Tam Suits and the Constitution, 62 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 609, 609 (1994); see also H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FALSE
CLAIMS AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1986, H.R. REP. No. 99-660, at 18 (1986) ("Evi-
dence of fraud in Government programs and procurement is on a steady
rise."); S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS ACT OF
1986, S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5267.
2. See Senator Claire McCaskill, Statement Before the Commission on
Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Lessons from the Inspectors
General: Improving Wartime Contracting (Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.wartime
contracting.gov/images/download/documents/hearings/20090202/Statement
of SenMcCaskill.pdf ("Hundreds of billions of dollars have disappeared. Eve-
rything has been stolen from money to heavy equipment to guns.").
3. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 3. The Department of Justice estimated fraud
as draining one to ten percent of the entire federal budget, costing taxpayers
valuable money and "erod[ing] public confidence in the Government's ability to
efficiently and effectively manage its programs." Id.; see also U.S. GEN. AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS: HOW EXTENSIVE IS IT?
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the federal government spent $532 billion on contracts, 4 an
amount vastly disproportionate to the funding given to the gov-
ernment to ensure the veracity of these agreements.5 Under the
current system, contractors routinely overcharge the govern-
ment for their services, knowing that law enforcement agencies
do not have the resources to verify contractors' stated costs and
expenses. 6 As a result, companies often perpetrate massive
fraud against the government. Examples include contractors
who sell defective body armor to police, health care companies
that overcharge Medicare and Medicaid for their services, and
insurance companies that illegally shift their losses to the fed-
eral government.7
Fred Burns, a former federal government employee, unco-
vered fraud against the government and fought to stop it.8
When working for the government as a construction represent-
How CAN IT BE CONTROLLED? passim (1981) (noting that fraud erodes public
confidence that government can efficiently run its programs).
4. Senator Susan M. Collins, Statement Before the Commission on War-
time Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Lessons from the Inspectors Gen-
eral: Improving Wartime Contracting (Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.wartime
contracting.gov/images/download/documents/hearings/20090202/Statement
ofSenCollins.pdf [hereinafter Senator Collins's Statement].
5. See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21,
§ 3(a)(1), 123 Stat. 1617, 1619 (2009) (authorizing $165 million a year for
fraud prosecution and investigation at the Justice Department for each of the
fiscal years 2010 and 2011); see also Proposals to Fight Fraud and Protect
Taxpayers: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 8
(2009) [hereinafter Proposals to Fight Fraud] (statement of Rita Galvin, Act-
ing Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice) (stat-
ing that the Justice Department needs more resources to prosecute fraud cas-
es).
6. See False Claims Act Correction Act (S. 2041): Strengthening the Gov-
ernment's Most Effective Tool Against Fraud for the 21st Century: Hearing Be-
fore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 Se-
nate Hearings] (statement of Sen. Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?db
name=1 10_senatehearings&docid=f:42809.wais.pdf.
7. See id. One of the most common forms of fraud against the govern-
ment occurs when contractors inflate the cost of their services, or submit
claims for goods or services not provided, thereby overcharging the govern-
ment for their work. See Carl Pacini & Michael Bret Hood, The Role of Qui
Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act in Preventing and Deterring Fraud
Against Government, 15 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 273, 292 (2007); see also Emily
R. D. Pruisner, Comment, The Extent of a Corporation's Ability to Constitute
an Original Source Under the False Claims Act-Minnesota Ass'n of Nurse
Anesthetists v. Allina Health System Corp., 87 MINN. L. REV. 1247, 1247
(2003).
8. United States ex rel. Burns v. A.D. Roe Co., 186 F.3d 717, 719 (6th Cir.
1999).
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ative, Burns supervised construction projects performed by pri-
vate contractors.9 While monitoring the construction sites,
Burns witnessed firsthand fraudulent activities by government
contractors and repeatedly urged his supervisors to investigate
this disturbing trend.10 Outraged by the lack of oversight and
accountability, Burns filed lawsuits in federal court to expose
the massive abuse against the government."
Burns filed these suits as a qui tam12 relator under the
federal False Claims Act (FCA),13 a statute that creates liabili-
ty for anyone who knowingly submits a false or fraudulent
claim for payment to the government.14 The FCA is the gov-
ernment's most successful civil litigation tool for combating
fraud, 15 and FCA proceeds amount to nearly $22 billion, with
qui tam lawsuits responsible for almost $14 billion of that
amount.16 As a relator, Burns had not personally suffered an
injury; rather, he brought these suits to vindicate the rights of
the government.' 7 Yet, the FCA provides that if the relator is
successful in his claim, he is entitled to up to thirty percent of
awarded damages.' 8 This number can be quite large as the
judge can double or treble the damages in these cases as a
9. Id. at 720 ("Burns was employed by the United States as the Con-
struction Representative. . . .").
10. Id. at 721 ("Burns also claims that prior to filing this action, he re-
ported all instances of fraud alleged in the complaint to either the NIS [Naval
Investigative Service], the contracting officer, the assistant officer in charge of
construction, or a naval detective."); see also Final Brief of the Appellant at
10-11, Burns, 186 F.3d 717 (No. 97-6044) ('The record further demonstrates
that the Appellant's allegations were based on his own first-hand and personal
observations during construction on the project.").
11. Burns, 186 F.3d at 719.
12. Qui tam is an abbreviation for the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino
rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur," which means, "who as well for the
king as for himself sues in this matter." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1368 (9th
ed. 2009).
13. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006).
14. See id. § 3729(a)(1); see also John M. Degnan & Sally A. Scoggin,
Avoiding Health Care Qui Tam Actions, 74 DEF. COUNS. J. 385, 385 (2007).
15. Michael Rich, Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Encouraging the Department
of Justice to Rein in Out-of-Control Qui Tam Litigation Under the Civil False
Claims Act, 76 U. CIN. L. REv. 1233, 1235 (2008).
16. Civil Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fraud Statistics-Overview, Oc-
tober 1, 1986-September 30, 2008, http://www.usdoj.govlopalpr/2008/November/
fraud-statisticsl986-2008.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Fraud
Statistics].
17. See United States ex rel. Burns v. A.D. Roe Co., 186 F.3d 717, 719 (6th
Cir. 1999).
18. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).
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means to deter fraud.19 Therefore, when Burns filed his law-
suit, he could have won millions of dollars, giving him an unde-
niable personal stake in the claim.
Burns's personal interest raises public policy issues about
whether government employees, 20 when acting in their individ-
ual capacities as agents of the government, should be able to
profit personally by litigating claims of fraud against the gov-
ernment.21 Courts divide on whether government employees
should be able to stand as relators: some courts question the
propriety of allowing an individual to recover for essentially
doing his job, while other courts recognize that qui tam actions
by government employees are not explicitly barred under the
plain language of the FCA.2 2 Additionally, Congress recognizes
that the issue of government employee relators needs further
clarification. Recently, Senator Charles Grassley introduced
legislation to grant these employees the right to bring qui tam
lawsuits under the FCA.2 3
Fraudulent conduct by contractors, coupled with the recent
economic crisis facing the United States, 24 necessitates a re-
thinking of the rights of government employees by Congress
and the Obama Administration. This Note argues that Con-
gress should pass legislation to allow federal government em-
ployees to act as relators to save the government money, deter
fraud, and increase the American citizenry's trust of govern-
19. Id. § 3729(a).
20. This Note uses the terms "government employee" and "federal em-
ployee" interchangeably to refer to employees of the United State Federal
Government.
21. See Virginia C. Theis, Note, Government Employees as Qui Tam Plain-
tiffs: Subverting the Purposes of the False Claims Act, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 225,
226 (1999) (stating that the FCA "raised many practical and policy issues
about the appropriateness of permitting government employees to benefit from
knowledge of fraudulent activity gained at work").
22. Compare United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493,
1494 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that a government employee may bring a qui
tam lawsuit), with United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 72 F.3d
740 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that a government employee does not qualify as an
"original source" under the FCA).
23. See False Claims Act Clarification Act of 2009, S. 458, 111th Cong. § 3
(2009).
24. See David W. Chen, Economists' Forecast: Chance of Change 100%,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2009, at A17 (discussing impacts of the economic reces-
sion); Gretchen Morgenson, Blank Check for Banks, Pink Slips for Detroit,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, at BU1 (commenting on congressional responses to
the economic crisis).
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ment.25 Congress should explicitly allow government employees
to bring qui tam actions for fraud uncovered in their profes-
sional capacities. 26 Part I provides a historical background of
the FCA, specifically describing the major changes to the sta-
tute since enactment, and outlining the current split among
circuit courts as to the rights of government employees under
the statute. Part II argues that Congress must allow govern-
ment employee relators to bring FCA qui tam actions to save
the government money and increase the public support of gov-
ernment projects. Finally, Part III urges Congress to pass legis-
lation amending the FCA to allow government employee rela-
tors.
I. THE CHANGING FACE OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
An examination of the origins of the FCA and its subse-
quent amendments is essential to understanding the current
controversy surrounding government employee relators. This
Part explores the historical background of the FCA and dis-
cusses the related circuit split.
A. THE ORIGINAL ACT AND SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS
In 1863, President Abraham Lincoln proposed the FCA to
protect the U.S. Treasury from fraud and abuse by Civil War
defense contractors. 27 Congress, angered by the number of de-
fense contractors cheating the government during a time of
need, 28 adopted the Act.29 The 1863 Act aided federal enforce-
25. See S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENT ACT OF
1986, S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5268 ("[Flraud erodes public confidence in the Government's ability to effi-
ciently and effectively manage its programs."); see also S. COMM. ON THE JUDI-
CIARY, FALSE CLAIMS ACT CORRECTION ACT OF 2008, S. REP. No. 110-507, at 8
(2008) ("As the [Government Accountability Office] pointed out, fraud erodes
public confidence in the Government's ability to efficiently and effectively
manage its programs. This is why the FCA is so important to not just the Gov-
ernment, but to American taxpayers." (footnote omitted)).
26. Cf. Gita F. Rothschild & Moon Kim, Increasing Use of Qui Tam
Claims, ALI-ABA Course of Study (2008), available at WL SN066 ALL-ABA
501, 505 ("Proposed amendments to strengthen the Act have been introduced
in Congress and are expected 'to energize the qui tam bar and generate a next
wave of False Claims Act litigation activity."' (citation omitted)).
27. See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FALSE CLAIMs ACT CORRECTION ACT
OF 2009, H.R. REP. No. 111-97, at 2-3 (2009) ("President Lincoln implored
Congress to pass legislation to address . .. incidences of fraud.").
28. See id. at 2 ("During the Civil War, fraud by Government contractors
had become so prevalent that the United States Army was often delivered de-
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ment efforts by encouraging individuals to "blow the whistle" if
they knew of plans to defraud the government. 30 During the
1930s and 1940s, the New Deal and World War II greatly ex-
panded the role of the federal government in the national econ-
omy, thereby increasing the opportunities for contractors to de-
fraud the government. 31 The number of qui tam suits initiated
by relators increased dramatically during this period, resulting
in abuse of the system. 32
Specifically, individuals with knowledge of the FCA began
waiting for prosecutors to file criminal indictments against de-
fense contractors in federal court and then immediately filing
qui tam actions against the same contractors. 33 The suits an-
gered members of Congress and the Department of Justice
(DOJ) because relators often brought actions based on informa-
tion obtained from external sources such as indictments, news-
papers, and other public records.34 The DOJ thought that these
crepit horses, or sold the same horse twice, and packages of gunpowder often
arrived filled with sawdust.").
29. See Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696, 696-99 (current version
at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006)); see also S. REP. No. 110-507, at 1 (discuss-
ing the historical foundations of the FCA); 132 CONG. REC. 22,335 (1986)
(statement of Rep. Glickman) ("This act, sometimes referred to as the 'Abra-
ham Lincoln Law,' was enacted amid reports of widespread corruption and
fraud . . . ."); 89 CONG. REC. 10,741 (1943) (statement of Sen. Langer) (describ-
ing the FCA's popular name as "the Lincoln statute").
30. Johnston, supra note 1, at 613; see also CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d
Sess. 956 (1863) (statement of Sen. Howard) ("I have based the [enforcement]
sections upon the old-fashioned idea of holding out a temptation, and 'setting a
rogue to catch a rogue,' which is the safest and most expeditious way I have
ever discovered of bringing rouges to justice.").
31. Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS. L.
REV. 381, 389 ("[The New Deal and World War II greatly expanded the role of
the federal government in the national economy, and commensurately ex-
panded the opportunities for unscrupulous contractors to defraud the govern-
ment.").
32. Theis, supra note 21, at 227 ("During the 1930s and 1940s, opportu-
nistic plaintiffs brought a series of 'parasitic' civil suits."); see also S. COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1986, S. REP. No. 99-
345, at 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5275 ("In the early
1940s, several qui tam actions were brought regarding World War II defense
procurement fraud. Some suits brought by private citizens appeared to be
based on criminal indictments brought by the Government.").
33. See generally JAMES B. HELMER, JR., FALSE CLAIMS ACT: WHISTLE-
BLOWER LITIGATION §§ 2-5 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing the abuse of qui tam ac-
tions that eventually led to the 1943 amendments to the FCA).
34. 89 CONG. REC. 10,846 (1943).
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"parasitical suits" only served to decrease the proceeds that the
government could otherwise recover on its own.3 5
The House of Representatives responded to the DOJ's con-
cerns by attempting to repeal the entire qui tam provision of
the FCA.3 6 The Senate, however, rejected such a draconian
measure. 37 It instead proposed legislation by which an "honest
informer," defined as an individual who contributed "original
information" to the government,38 could maintain a qui tam
lawsuit.3 9 Congress, in 1943, eventually enacted new qui tam
provisions to the FCA, prohibiting relators from bringing ac-
tions based on evidence or information possessed by the United
States. 40
Notably, the 1943 amendments to the FCA effectively
barred qui tam suits by federal government employees.41
35. See United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1104 (7th
Cir. 1984).
36. See Susan G. Fentin, Note, The False Claims Act-Finding Middle
Ground Between Opportunity and Opportunism: The "Original Source" Provi-
sion of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4), 17 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 255, 260 (1995) ("At-
torney General Francis Biddle requested that Congress repeal the entire qui
tam provision. The House of Representatives followed his direction.").
37. 89 CONG. REC. 10,845 (1943); see also Fentin, supra note 36, at 260
("The Senate, however, was reluctant to eliminate the provision altogether,
citing fears of governmental delay and inadequate enforcement if the qui tam
provision were totally repealed.").
38. See H. COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS ACT OF
1992, H.R. REP. No. 102-837, at 4 (1992) (discussing the 1943 amendment and
noting two types of honest informer actions: "(1) suits by those who had inde-
pendent information of fraud that the government also happened to possess;
and (2) suits by those who had given the information to the government before
they sued and then found themselves barred by having done so").
39. 89 CONG. REC. 7572 (1943).
40. See United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 729 F. Supp. 170,
174 n.6 (D. Mass. 1990) ("That jurisdictional bar was included in the False
Claims Act in 1943, in order to stem the tide of 'parasitical actions' in which
relators would base their litigation on information already secured by the gov-
ernment in the regular course of law enforcement."); Tammy Hinshaw, Con-
struction and Application of "Public Disclosure" and "Original Source" Juris-
diction Bars Under 31 USCS § 3730(e)(4) (Civil Actions for False Claims), 117
A.L.R. FED. 263, 275 (1995) ("Congress ... amended the qui tam provisions of
the FCA to bar all qui tam actions based on information that the government
already possessed."); Theis, supra note 21, at 227-29 (discussing congressional
action prohibiting parasitic suits).
41. See 89 CONG. REC. 10,846 (1943) (statement of Rep. Walter) ("We feel
that by enacting this compromise legislation . . . there will not be this ever-
present invitation ... for dishonest and unscrupulous [government] investiga-
tors to turn over information to their friends or co-conspirators for the purpose
of bringing suit against our citizens on information that - . . comes to them in
their official capacity as a representative of the United States."); Patrick W.
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Courts interpreted the statute as prohibiting private qui tam
suits when the government already possessed the information,
regardless of the source. 42 Passage of these amendments caused
a sharp decline in the use of the FCA's qui tam provision.43
A large federal budget deficit and continued illegal pro-
curement of government funds led Congress to amend the FCA
once again in 1986.44 Congress rushed to action after receiving
alarming media reports of contractor abuse and adopted
amendments to strengthen the government's ability to prose-
cute civil fraud.45 The most significant change concerned the
understanding of the qui tam relator. 46 Congress promoted pri-
vate enforcement of the FCA by authorizing any "person"
standing to file a qui tam action with limited exceptions. 47 In
the 1986 amendments, Congress removed the language from
the 1943 amendments that precluded government employees
from standing in court as relators.48
The 1986 amendments represented the last substantive
modification to the FCA relating to the role of qui tam relators.
Currently, under the FCA, a relator must provide a copy of the
complaint, and all the information that forms the basis for the
Hanifin, Qui Tam Suits by Federal Government Employees Based on Govern-
ment Information, 20 PUB. CONT. L.J. 556, 557 (1991) ("For many years the
Act clearly barred federal government employees from bringing private ac-
tion.").
42. See Theis, supra note 21, at 229-30 ("Although parasitic suits were
successfully barred, so too were claims brought by parties who had provided
the Government with information about a false claim but had not yet filed a
suit.").
43. See Bales, supra note 31, at 389-90 ("[Tlhese changes all but elimi-
nated the use of the FCA qui tam."); Theis, supra note 21, at 229 ("After the
1943 amendments, the use of the qui tam provision as a weapon to combat
fraud against the Government declined substantially.").
44. See S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FALSE CLAIMS ACT CORRECTION ACT
OF 2008, S. REP. NO. 110-507, at 4 (2008); 131 CONG. REC. 17,818 (1985)
(statement of Rep. Weiss); see also Gravitt v. Gen. Elec. Co., 680 F. Supp.
1162, 1164 (S.D. Ohio 1988), appeal dismissed sub nom. United States ex rel.
Gravitt v. Gen. Elec. Co. 848 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
901 (1988).
45. See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS ACT OF
1986, H. REP. No. 99-660, at 16 (1986); see also S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1986, S. REP. No. 99-345, at 23 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267.
46. Major David Wallace, Government Employees as Qui Tam Relators,
1996 ARMY LAW. 14, 16.
47. Id. at 18.
48. Miro Kovacevic, The False Claims Act: Government Employees as Qui
Tam Plaintiffs in the Tenth Circuit, 80 DENV. U. L. REv. 625, 628 (2003).
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action, to the DOJ.49 The DOJ keeps the complaint under seal
for the first sixty days after the relator files it.50 During this
time, the DOJ must investigate the case and determine wheth-
er the government should intervene.51 If the government choos-
es to intervene, then it has the primary responsibility for prose-
cuting the case. 52 If the DOJ declines intervention, then the
relator may proceed with the action independent of the gov-
ernment. 53
Congress has substantively altered the role of qui tam rela-
tors under the FCA twice since enacted in 1863. Because the
1986 amendments to the FCA did not explicitly address wheth-
er federal employees have standing as relators, courts struggle
when interpreting the legality of these types of cases.
B. FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT DISAGREEMENT OVER
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATORS
The legality of government employee relators divides
courts. 54 All courts conclude that Congress's 1986 amendments
to the FCA did not explicitly exclude government employees
from prosecuting qui tam actions.55 Nonetheless, federal circuit
courts differ as to whether the FCA permits government em-
ployees to bring qui tam suits based on information obtained in
the course of their employment.56
On the one hand, some courts favor granting federal em-
ployees standing under the FCA.57 For example, under the Ele-
venth Circuit's interpretation, the FCA allows government em-
ployees to bring qui tam actions, subject to the same
49. JAMES T. BLANCH ET AL., CITIZEN SUITS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS: PRI-
VATE ENFORCEMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY 60 (1996).
50. Id.
51. Id. ("The purpose of this sixty-day sealing requirement is to give DOJ
an opportunity to review the complaint and accompanying information and to
decide whether it wishes to intervene in the action."); see also Avco Corp. v.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, 884 F.2d 621, 626 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States ex rel.
Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs., 777 F. Supp. 195, 198 (N.D.N.Y.
1991), aff'd, 985 F.2d 1148 (2d. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 973 (1993).
52. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2006); BLANCH, supra note 49, at 60.
53. See BLANCH, supra note 49, at 60.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 56.
56. See Hanifin, supra note 41, at 557.
57. See United States ex rel. Holmes v. Consumer Ins. Group, 318 F.3d
1199, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003) (en banc); United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC
Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1501 (11th Cir. 1991).
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requirements as all other relators.5 8 In United States ex rel.
Williams v. NEC Corp.,5 9 the Eleventh Circuit held that the
plain language of the original source requirement,6 o which lists
individuals who are prohibited from acting as qui tam relators,
is exhaustive. 61 The court refused to give the statute a broader
reading than necessitated by this plain language and, since
government employees are not unambiguously excluded as re-
lators in the original source requirement, the court held that
they are entitled to standing under the Act. 6 2 The Sixth Circuit,
Tenth Circuit, and many district courts also employ this rea-
soning.63
On the other hand, the First and Ninth Circuits have af-
firmed the dismissal of federal employee qui tam actions using
a statutory interpretation analysis of the "original source" ex-
clusion of the FCA.64 The First Circuit, in United States ex rel.
LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co.,65 held that a government employee
could not bring a qui tam action based upon information that
he obtained in his government employment.66 The court stated
58. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1199.
59. 931 F.2d 1493.
60. The specific language of the FCA provides:
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action . . . based upon the
public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or
administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Gov-
ernment Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or
from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney
General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the
information.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
61. Williams, 931 F.2d at 1502-03.
62. Id. at 1449-1500.
63. The Sixth Circuit explained its holding in United States ex rel. Burns
v. A.D. Roe Co., 186 F.3d 717, 723-26 (6th Cir. 1999), and the Tenth Circuit
agreed in Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1202-12, and in United States ex rel. Fine v.
Sandia Corp., 70 F.3d 568, 570 (10th Cir. 1995). The Eastern District of Vir-
ginia came to the same conclusion in Erikson ex rel. United States v. American
Institute of Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908, 918 (E.D. Va. 1989). The
Middle District of Georgia agreed in United States ex rel. McDowell v. McDon-
nel Douglas Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1038, 1040 (M.D. Ga. 1991), the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida in United States v. CAC-Ramsay, 744 F. Supp. 1158, 1160 (S.D.
Fla. 1990), aff'd, 963 F.2d 384 (11th Cir. 1992), and the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in United States ex rel. Givler v. Smith, 760 F. Supp. 72, 74
(E.D. Pa. 1991).
64. See United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 72 F.3d 740,
743-44 (9th Cir. 1995); United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913
F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990).
65. 913 F.2d at 17.
66. Id. at 18.
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that any government employee responsible for exposing fraud
as a condition of his job does not qualify as an "original source"
under the FCA.67 Specifically, the court found that government
employees cannot overcome the independent knowledge bar of
the FCA.68 The court limited its holding, however, by stating
that its decision did "not mean that there is no government
employee who could qualify to bring a qui tam action."69 Never-
theless, the court noted that it did not intend to "draft a litiga-
tion manual" explaining when government employees are al-
lowed to bring these lawsuits. 70 The Ninth Circuit applies the
same interpretation as the First Circuit.71 Several district
courts also have adopted the First and Ninth Circuits' approach
to the issue. 72 The diverse interpretations of the legality of fed-
eral employee relators under the FCA have led to proposals by
Congressmen to reassess whether to explicitly allow govern-
ment employees to serve as qui tam relators.
C. CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO RECTIFY THE GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEE RELATOR CONUNDRUM
Since 1986, Congress has dealt with the issue of whether to
allow federal employees to serve as qui tam relators on several
occasions. Though the goal in the 1986 amendments was to in-
crease the number of qui tam lawsuits, 73 the congressional
record is silent as to whether Congress even considered qui tam
67. Id. at 20.
68. Id. at 17.
69. Id. at 20.
70. Id.
71. See United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 72 F.3d 740,
740 (9th Cir. 1995).
72. These courts include the Western District of Washington in United
States ex rcl. Tipton v. Niles Chemical Paint Co., No. C98-5177RJB, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21604, at *12 (W.D. Wash. May 6, 1999); the Southern District of
New York in United States ex rel. Pentagen Technologies International Ltd. v.
CACI International Inc., No. 96 Civ. 7827, 1997 WL 724553, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 15, 1997); the Southern District of Texas in United States ex rel. Wercin-
ski v. IBM Corp., 982 F. Supp. 449, 456 (S.D. Tex. 1997); and the District of
Columbia in United States ex rel. Schwedt v. Planning Research Corp., 39 F.
Supp. 2d 28, 34 (D.D.C. 1999), and United States ex rel. Foust v. Blue Cross
Blue Shield, 26 F. Supp. 2d 60, 66 (D.D.C. 1998).
73. Marianne Lavelle & Fred Strasser, OSHA Penalties Up, But Still Be-
low Limits, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 27, 1992, at 7 ("When Congress revised the False
Claims Act in 1986, the goal was to give whistleblowers an incentive to expose
fraud against the government.. . . Simple enough.").
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actions brought by government employees. 74 Indeed, it appears
that government employee qui tam actions were an unintended
result of the 1986 amendments.75 In 1990, the Subcommittee
on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the
House Judiciary Committee held the first oversight hearing on
the 1986 amendments and called Senator Grassley-the lead
sponsor of the 1986 amendments-as a witness to testify about
whether Congress intended to allow government employee rela-
tors.7 6 Senator Grassley testified that the courts should allow
government employees to prosecute a qui tam action "as long as
[the employee] can show that he first made a good faith effort
within the proper channels [to internally report fraud]."77 Al-
though Congress did not introduce amendments to the FCA re-
garding relators in that session, the 1990 hearing demonstrates
that Congress was aware of the issue of federal employee qui
tam actions.78
In 1992, Senator Grassley and Representative Berman in-
troduced bills that explicitly granted government employees
standing to prosecute qui tam actions.79 Under these bills, gov-
ernment employee relators would be required to make a writ-
ten disclosure to their agency of all material evidence and in-
formation that relates to the violation of the FCA prior to filing
a qui tam action.80 If the Attorney General did not file a lawsuit
within one year of that report, then the employee could file a
qui tam action on his own.81 Additionally, the bill would have
placed a ten-percent cap on federal employees' qui tam recov-
74. See False Claims Act Technical Amendments of 1992: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 55 (1992) (statement of Rep. Berman,
Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("[N]o thought was given to the question
of government employees. I cannot say it was our intent to cover them or to
exclude them, because we never thought about the question.").
75. Dan L. Hargrove, Soldiers of Qui Tam Fortune: Do Military Service
Members Have Standing to File Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act?,
34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 45, 64 (2004) ("Government employee qui tam actions ap-
peared to be an unforeseen result of the 1986 Amendments.").
76. False Claims Act Implementation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 101st Cong. 1 (1990).
77. Id. at 7.
78. Hargrove, supra note 75, at 66.
79. Lavelle & Strasser, supra note 73, at 7 (discussing the views of Rep.
Berman).
80. H. COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS ACT OF
1992, H.R. REP. No. 102-837, at 2 (1992).
81. Id.
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ery.82 The House passed Representative Berman's bill and the
Senate considered it, but ultimately the bill died in the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary.83
In 2007, Senator Grassley proposed additional amend-
ments to the FCA in a bill entitled the "False Claims Act Cor-
rection Act of 2007."84 Significantly, the bill outlined the cir-
cumstances under which a government employee could serve as
a relator in a qui tam lawsuit.85 Section 3 of the bill authorized
a government employee to file suit based on information
learned during the course of the employee's duties unless: (1)
the employee derived "all the necessary and specific material
allegations" underlying the action "from an open and active
fraud investigation," or (2) the employee failed to disclose "sub-
stantially all material evidence" in his possession to certain
designated federal officials prior to filing the suit.86 According
to this bill, a government employee could bring a FCA qui tam
action only if the Attorney General failed to bring a claim based
on the disclosed information within twelve months.87 Even
though this bill passed out of the Senate Committee on the Ju-
diciary, it never made it to a floor vote.88
Two years later, Senator Grassley reintroduced legislation
to allow government employee relators called the "False Claims
Act Clarification Act of 2009."89 This bill has many notable dif-
ferences from the 2007 version. First, it expands the definition
of a federal government employee to include "immediate family
member[s]." 90 Second, the bill increases the length of time that
the government can move to dismiss the lawsuit from 60 to 120
days.9 1 Third, it gives the attorney general eighteen rather
than twelve months to initiate a qui tam action based on a re-
82. Id.
83. See Hargrove, supra note 75, at 67-68. Senator Grassley introduced S.
841, which was the companion version of Representative Berman's bill. Id. at
68 n.158. Although S. 841 was referred to committee and hearings were held,
it was never voted out of committee. Id.
84. False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007, S. 2041, 110th Cong. § 2
(2007).
85. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FALSE CLAIMS ACT CORRECTION ACT OF
2008, S. REP. No. 110-507, at 12 (2008).
86. S. 2041 § 3.
87. Id.
88. See S. REP. NO. 110-507, at 13.
89. False Claims Act Clarification Act of 2009, S. 458, 111th Cong. § 1
(2009).
90. Id. § 3.
91. Id.
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port by a government employee. 92 As of early 2010, this bill is
currently pending in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.93
Thus, the 1986 amendments increased opportunities for all
relators to bring claims under the FCA. The sponsors of the
amendments, however, did not specify whether government
employees could file qui tam suits based on information ob-
tained in the course of their employment. As such, federal
courts divide on the issue of whether government employees
have standing as relators in FCA qui tam cases. Congressmen
have attempted to address the issue of federal employee rela-
tors by introducing amendments to the FCA, but Congress has
not passed legislation relating to this predicament. Part II of
this Note explains why Congress must take action to allow gov-
ernment employee qui tam relators.
II. FRAUD AND GOVERNMENT RELATORS
Contractors routinely perpetuate fraud against the U.S.
government.94 This fraud, coupled with a nearly unprecedented
economic crisis, has contributed to public opinion of govern-
ment competence sinking near an all time low.95 This Part ar-
92. Id.
93. The Library of Congress, THOMAS, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.uscongress/
legislation. 111s458 (reporting bill status as "referred to the Committee for Ju-
diciary" on February 24, 2009) (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
94. See, e.g., Statement of Michael Thibault & Grant Green, Co-Chairs,
Statement Before the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afg-
hanistan, Lessons from the Inspectors General: Improving Wartime Contract-
ing (Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/images/download/
documents/hearings/20090202/JointStatementMichaelThibaultGrantGreen
.pdf ("America's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have ... involved billions of dol-
lars in waste, fraud, and abuse [by contractors].").
95. See Senator Jim Webb, Statement Before the Commission on Wartime
Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Lessons from the Inspectors General:
Improving Wartime Contracting (Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.wartimecontracting
.gov/images/download/documents/hearings/20090202/Statement_of_SenatorJim
Webb.pdf [hereinafter Senator Webb's Statement] (noting that decreasing
fraudulent conduct by government contractors is needed "to restore public
trust in [the] process"); see also S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FALSE CLAIMs
ACT CORRECTION ACT OF 2008, S. REP. NO. 110-507, at 8 (2008) ("[F]raud
erodes public confidence in the Government's ability to efficiently and effec-
tively manage its programs.... [The FCA] offers an opportunity for the Gov-
ernment to win back the hearts and minds of taxpayers who believe the Gov-
ernment does not care how taxpayer dollars are spent."); Jeffrey M. Jones, et
al., The Decade in Review: Four Key Trends, GALLUP, Dec. 23, 2009, http://www
.gallup.com/poll/124787/Decade-Review-Four-Key-Trends.aspx (discussing the
public's perception of problems facing the United States and changes in the
public's approval of Congress and the President).
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gues that if Congress grants government employees standing
as relators, the government will save money and the public's
confidence in government will increase. 96
A. ALLOWING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO FILE QuI TAM
ACTIONS WILL RESULT IN THE PROSECUTION OF MORE FRAUD
CASES AND SAVE THE GOVERNMENT MONEY
Congress should allow government employees to act as re-
lators because the government lacks resources to properly com-
bat fraud.97 Currently, many fraud allegations remain unad-
dressed because the federal government faces budgetary
constraints.98 The DOJ has not dedicated enough lawyers and
investigators to pursue fraud cases and has a backlog of more
than one thousand FCA cases. 99 Assuming relators bring no
new FCA cases to the DOJ, it would take over ten years to re-
solve the cases currently pending at the present pace of inves-
tigation and enforcement. 00 Allegations of fraud against the
government that could possibly develop into significant FCA
cases often remain unaddressed because the DOJ lacks staff to
analyze which cases are the most efficient to pursue. 101 Moreo-
ver, the recent bailouts of the financial industry'0 2 and the glo-
omy economic forecast 03 mean that there will be less money for
the government to give to attorneys, auditors, and investigators
to address fraud against the government.104
96. Aaron R. Petty, How Qui Tam Actions Could Fight Public Corruption,
39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 851, 876 (2006) ("People will have more faith in a
system that they feel they have more influence over, corrupt acts will be de-
terred as a result of the qui tarn actions .... ).
97. Joan R. Bullock, The Pebble in the Shoe: Making the Case for the Gov-
ernment Employee, 60 TENN. L. REV. 365, 386 (1993); see also sources cited su-
pra note 5.
98. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS ACT OF
1986, S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5272; Bullock, supra note 97, at 386.
99. See 2008 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 2 (statement of Sen. Leahy,
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
100. Id. ("Now, assuming no new cases were brought, at the current pace
that would take 10 years to resolve. That is assuming no new cases.").
101. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 7 ("Allegations that perhaps could develop
into very significant cases are often left unaddressed at the outset due to a
judgment that devoting scarce resources to a questionable case may not be ef-
ficient.").
102. See, e.g., Morgenson, supra note 24.
103. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 24, at A17.
104. See 111 CONG. REC. S1682 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Leahy). Senator Leahy stated that "[tihe Federal Government has spent hun-
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Additionally, there may be political motivations for why
the DOJ has resisted pursuing FCA cases. Indeed, there is a
discrepancy between the number of FCA settlements in the de-
fense industry compared with those in other industries. 105 Over
the past five years, the DOJ participated in more than six hun-
dred false claims settlements nationwide and recovered more
than $10 billion. 06 Since 2002, the government contracted for
over $500 billion of goods and services to support the United
States' conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.107 News reports esti-
mate that billions of taxpayer dollars have been lost to fraud,
waste, and abuse in these conflicts.108 During that time, howev-
er, the DOJ participated in only five settlements involving con-
tracting fraud in Iraq and Afghanistan and has recovered only
$16 million-an amount that is less than two tenths of one per-
cent of the overall total of FCA recoveries. 109 Even more strik-
ing, the DOJ has only initiated a few cases involving fraud from
defense contractors during engagement of the United States in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and investigations into defense contracts
worth billions remain pending.110
dreds of billions of dollars to stabilize our banking system, and ... even more
to restart our economic recovery. But to date, we have paid far too little atten-
tion to investigating and prosecuting the mortgage and corporate frauds that
has [sic] so dramatically contributed to this economic collapse." Id. The Sena-
tor then urged "Congress [to] move quickly to pass this legislation so the
American taxpayers can be confident that those who are criminally responsi-
ble for contributing to this economic disaster are caught and held fully accoun-
table and to ensure that the money we are now spending to restore America is
protected from fraud in the future." Id.
105. See S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FALSE CLAIMS ACT CORRECTION ACT
OF 2008, S. REP. NO. 110-507, at 8 (2008) ("Of the over 5,800 qui tam FCA cas-
es filed since 1986, more than half (roughly 3,117) have focused on fraud
against Government health care programs. These cases have recovered over
$9 billion of the $12.6 billion recovered through qui tam cases since 1986
(nearly 72 percent). Frauds against the Department of Defense ranked second
with over $1.6 billion of qui tam recoveries (nearly 13 percent).").
106. 2008 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 2 (statement of Sen. Leahy,
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
107. See id.
108. See id. at 2-3; see also Senator Collins's Statement, supra note 4 (de-
scribing instances of contractor misuse and abuse of funds).
109. 2008 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 2 (statement of Sen. Leahy,
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("[T]he Justice Department partici-
pated in only five settlements involving contracting fraud in Iraq and Afgha-
nistan, recovered a mere $16 million-less than two tenths of 1 percent of the
overall total.").
110. See S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, WARTIME ENFORCEMENT OF FRAUD
ACT OF 2008, S. REP. NO. 110-431, at 2 (2008) ('The Department of Jus-
tice . . . has only initiated a few cases involving less than $30 million lost to
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Many legislators argue that this small recovery is due to
the politicalization of the DOJ in recent years.' 1 These legisla-
tors are concerned that the DOJ has maintained an unspoken
policy that pursuing unscrupulous defense contractors would be
a distraction from its goals in Iraq and Afghanistan.112 Cur-
rently, there are over 230 FCA cases involving defense contrac-
tor fraud under seal at the DOJ.113 Politicians worry that the
DOJ has been protecting these defense contractors-who are
often politically well-connected and represented by lobbyists-
and bilking the taxpayers as a result.114 Usually, government
employees are the first individuals to learn of fraud and waste
by defense contractors, but have limited avenues to encourage
the DOJ to prosecute these cases. 115 As such, Congress should
recognize that allowing government employees to bring qui tam
actions would help decrease the risk of politics meddling in the
prosecution of fraudulent contractors.
Congress should also recognize that allowing government
employees to serve as relators may save the government money
and hold contractors accountable. In enacting the FCA, Con-
gress recognized that "assistance from the private citizenry can
fraud, while hundreds of investigations into contracts worth billions remain
pending .... ).
111. See, e.g., 2008 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 2 (statement of Sen.
Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("In light of the politicalization
of the Justice Department, many wonder whether it has resisted pursuing cer-
tain false claims cases for political reasons-most notably those involving con-
tracting fraud related to the war in Iraq and Afghanistan."); see also Jay
Bookman, Gonzales' Lies Give Justice a Dirty Name, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar.
19, 2007, at All (describing the firing of U.S. attorneys for political reasons).
112. See, e.g., 2008 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 3 (statement of Sen.
Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("The administration has ap-
parently decided that pursuing unscrupulous defense contractors would be
embarrassing, and aggressively pursuing these frauds is not their priority.");
Hargrove, supra note 75, at 88 ("There is also a concern that the Defense de-
partment has some incentive to shield its contractors from reports of
fraud. . . .").
113. 2008 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 8-9 (statement of Sen. Leahy,
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("The AG says there are 230 false claim
cases involving defense procurement fraud under seal at the Justice Depart-
ment.").
114. See, e.g., id. at 3 (noting that the DOJ ought to be recovering money
from fraudulent contractors, rather than protecting the "politically connected
people who are bilking the taxpayers").
115. See id. at 9 ("[A] Government employee [is] ... usually, the first one
who can see fraud and waste, you know, the trucks get a flat tire, and they
just leave the trucks behind, the huge amounts of money that Halliburton was
spending on hotels and things like this. They are the ones who are going to see
it.").
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make a significant impact on bolstering the Government's
fraud enforcement effort."116 In fact, this was a major reason
why Congress amended the FCA's qui tam provision in 1986.117
Though personal financial gain may be the motivating factor
for a government employee to bring a qui tam action, the gov-
ernment stands to recover at least seventy percent-if not one-
hundred percent of the recovery."i8 As one Senator recently
noted, for every single dollar spent enforcing the law in FCA
health care cases, the government recovers fifteen.119 Further,
allowing government employees to bring FCA claims will likely
deter unscrupulous contractors attempting to defraud the gov-
ernment because they can no longer rely on the ineffectiveness
of government employees tasked with searching for illegal ac-
tivity.12 0 Accordingly, there is a strong policy justification for
allowing government employees to vigorously pursue these cas-
es.
B. ALLOWING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO FILE Qui TAM
ACTIONS WILL RESTORE THE PUBLIC'S FAITH IN GOVERNMENT
Allowing government employees to serve as qui tam rela-
tors will save the government money, which will restore the
public's faith in government. Recent cases involving FCA fraud
include hospitals overstating Medicare reimbursements,121
people submitting false proof of loss claims to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),1 22 defense contrac-
116. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS ACT OF
1986, S. REP. No. 99-345, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5273.
117. Bullock, supra note 97, at 386-87.
118. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006); Bullock, supra note 97, at 386-87.
119. 2008 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 2 (statement of Sen. Leahy,
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
120. Bullock, supra note 97, at 387.
121. See, e.g., United States v. Rogan, No. 02 C 3310, 2005 WL 2861033, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2005) (involving Defendant's alleged falsification of an-
nual reports to Medicare). Additionally, American International Group's (AIG)
use of government funds to provide bonuses to its employees has left many
people believing that the federal government does not know how to manage
their taxpayer dollars. See Carla Marinucci, Obama Outraged at AIG: Presi-
dent Tells Californians He'll Take Responsibility for Bailout-Bonus Scandal,
S.F. CHRON., Mar. 19, 2009, at Al.
122. Mary Vallis, Katrina Spirit Drowns in Fraud: False Claims, Bribery:
Charges Add to Frustration of U.S. Charities, NAVL POST, Dec. 4, 2006, at A3.
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tors inflating the cost of their goods and services,123 and con-
struction contractors overcharging the government in their con-
tracts.124 A particularly relevant example of such fraud is Unit-
ed States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, L.L.C.,1 25 a case
that involved a qui tam action under the FCA against a compa-
ny accused of defrauding the American government during the
Iraq War by providing false invoices and failing to perform con-
tracts.126 Cases such as Custer Battles have garnered front-
page news coverage across the country, 127 which has angered
taxpayers and decreased their trust in government pro-
grams.128 Allowing government employees to become relators is
a meaningful solution to the wide-scale distrust in government.
1. Government Employees Are in a Unique Position to Expose
Fraud
The government clearly lacks the resources to root out
fraud. Paying for two wars, a stimulus bill,129 and possibly a
healthcare reform bill'30 means that the government is a bit
123. See Senator Webb's Statement, supra note 95 (noting the importance
of decreasing fraudulent conduct by defense contractors in order "to restore
public trust" in war support contracting).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Ehrlich, 643 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1981) (in-
volving intentional overstatement of construction costs by the builder of a fed-
erally subsidized housing project).
125. 376 F. Supp. 2d 617 (E.D. Va. 2005), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 562
F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2009).
126. Id. at 619. For example, Custer Battles used shell companies to falsely
charge for costs never incurred. Custer Battles was also accused of fraudulent-
ly receiving payment for "services and facilities ... [that were] never pro-
vided." Id.
127. See, e.g., James Glanz, Contractor Must Pay in Iraq Fraud, Court
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2009, at A6.
128. See S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FALSE CLAIMS ACT CORRECTION ACT
OF 2008, S. REP. No. 110-507, at 8 (2008) ("As the GAO pointed out, fraud
erodes public confidence in the Government's ability to efficiently and effec-
tively manage its programs." (footnote omitted)).
129. See Edmund L. Andrews, Economists See a Limited Boost from Stimu-
lus, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2009, at Al. ("[S]timulus program was only one com-
ponent of a broader effort to combat the financial crisis. . . . The Federal Re-
serve printed vast amounts of additional money . . . . It is in the process of
buying up $1.25 trillion worth of mortgage-backed securities . . . ."). Moreover,
the economic stimulus plan doles out a lot of money "over a short period of
time" which is associated with people trying "to exploit the system and crimi-
nally profit." See Proposals to Fight Fraud, supra note 5, at 7 (statement of Ri-
ta Galvin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Department of
Justice).
130. See David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, While Confident Health
Care Will Pass This Year, Democrats Still Search for a Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
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strapped for cash. Therefore, it is even more reliant on the co-
operation of those who are close observers of the fraudulent ac-
tivity to successfully uncover fraud.131 In this respect, govern-
ment employees are in a unique position to ascertain and
expose fraud given their proximity and access to government
contractors.
For example, in United States ex rel. Williams u. NEC
Corp.,132 Arthur Williams, a government employee for the Air
Force, detected that Japanese contractors were overcharging
for their services and reported the fraud to his superiors. 133 His
supervisors, instead of investigating the alleged fraud, started
an investigation into Mr. Williams. 13 4 As a result, Mr. Williams
filed a complaint under the qui tam provision of the FCA,135 re-
sulting in the United States winning a $34 million settlement
against the Japanese company.136 As this case demonstrates,
government employees have access to information relating to
fraudulent conduct by contractors and thus have a unique op-
portunity to stop it.
2. Government Employees Currently Fear Retribution and
Lack Avenues to Report Fraud
Government employees currently lack appropriate avenues
to report fraud.137 The U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board
29, 2010, at All ("Democratic leaders in Congress voiced resolute optim-
ism ... that they would adopt major health care legislation this year. . . .").
131. See S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS ACT OF
1986, S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5269 ("Detecting fraud is usually very difficult without the cooperation of indi-
viduals who are either close observers or otherwise involved in the fraudulent
activity.").
132. 931 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1991).
133. Id. at 1495.
134. Herbert Hafif & Phillip E. Benson, Qui Tam': No Scam, WASH. POST,
Jan. 28, 1992, at A21.
135. Williams, 931 F.2d at 1495-96.
136. Louis Freedberg, Payoffs Challenged: Blowing a Whistle on Whistle-
Blowers, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 1, 1992, at Al. This case is not the only example.
In another case, Leon Weinstein, a Miami investigator in the Inspector Gener-
al's office of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, initiated a
qui tam action against heath care providers alleging that they overcharged the
government for their services. United States v. CAC-Ramsay, Inc., 744 F.
Supp. 1158, 1159 (S.D. Fla. 1990). Because of the inaction of the Inspector
General, Weinstein retired and brought a case under the FCA. Id. at 1160.
The DOJ challenged Weinstein's right to sue as a former government em-
ployee relator, but nonetheless joined in the action and recovered $160,000 in
a settlement. Id. at 1159.
137. See Bullock, supra note 97, at 386-87 (noting that despite the exis-
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(MSPB), an independent agency in the executive branch,138
conducted a survey of government employees in 2000 to discov-
er the way federal employees respond to suspicions of fraud.13 9
The MSPB found that only seven percent of government em-
ployees made formal disclosures of unlawful behavior, fraud,
waste, or abuse in the previous two years.140 Of the seven per-
cent of federal employees who reported fraud, waste, or abuse,
however, forty-four percent reported experiencing retaliation.141
According to the study, government employees often fail to re-
port information of fraud, waste, or abuse because they fear re-
taliation from their superiors and sense that they will have li-
mited protection after they file a report.142
The MSPB survey results show that when government em-
ployees know of fraud they often are unable to report it because
they fear retribution.143 Indeed, "[w]histleblowers frequently
risk everything when bringing false claim cases."14 4 Although
the FCA protects qui tam relators from adverse employment
actions,145 there are significant risks facing a government em-
tence of pervasive fraud against the government, employees are unwilling or
unable to report it).
138. The MSPB is an independent, quasijudicial agency in the executive
branch that serves as the guardian of federal merit systems. About MSPB,
http://www.mspb.gov/sites/mspb/pages/About%20MSPB.aspx (last visited Mar.
14, 2010). MSPB is responsible for studying the efficiency and effectiveness of
federal merit systems and ensuring they are free of prohibited personnel prac-
tices. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, http://www.mspb.gov/ (last visited
Mar. 14, 2010).
139. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY: RESULTS OF THE MERIT PRINCIPLES SURVEY 2000, at x, 33-35, 34
tbl.6 (2003), http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber-253631&
version=253918&application=ACROBAT.
140. Id. at x.
141. Id. at x, 35. Notably, the percentage of federal employees who say they
have experienced reprisal for reporting fraud, waste, or abuse remained at
nearly the same levels for a decade. Id. at 34 & tbl.6.
142. Id. at 35.
143. Id. at 33-35; see 2008 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 8 (statement
of Sen. Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (stating that many
times when government employees report fraud "it is reported to the detri-
ment of the career of the person doing the reporting"); Elletta Sangrey Calla-
han, Double Dippers or Bureaucracy Busters? False Claims Act Suits by Gov-
ernment Employees, 49 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 97, 117-19 (1996)
(discussing various MSPB studies of government employees' reluctance to re-
port corruption for fear of retaliation).
144. Medicaid Waste, Fraud, and Abuse: Threatening the Health Care Safe-
ty Net: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 44 (2005) (open-
ing statement of Sen. Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance).
145. The FCA prohibits discharge, demotion, suspension, and harassment
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ployee who becomes a qui tam relator. 146 Filing an FCA lawsuit
may hurt the employee's chances of getting a promotion, or al-
ternatively, if the complaint results in suspension of a govern-
ment contract, the relator may have difficulty gaining work
elsewhere in the same industry.147 Therefore, a potential rela-
tor will likely only initiate a qui tam action if the expected
gains from the lawsuit outweigh the expected gain from a con-
tinued government career.148
Many commentators disagree with allowing government
employees to serve as qui tam relators and argue that permit-
ting federal government employees to bring qui tam suits con-
flicts with their official duties.149 If government employees can
bring qui tam actions, opponents argue, they may spend all
their time examining government contracts that are likely the
most lucrative target of qui tam actions, while ignoring other
official duties. 50 Government investigators may have an incen-
tive to conceal or minimize information about fraud so that
they can capitalize on it for personal gain.151 Further, commen-
tators worry that granting government employees the right to
sue under the FCA could create mistrust among government
resulting from an employee's status as a relator. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)
(2006).
146. Petty, supra note 96, at 873.
147. Id.; see, e.g., United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc.,
714 F. Supp. 1084, 1099 (C.D. Cal. 1989) ("[The disclosure of the discovery of
the alleged fraud to the superior or the government may create difficulty in
finding future employment in the same industry."); see also False Claims Act
Technical Amendments of 1992: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administra-
tive Law and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d
Cong. 94 (1992) (testimony of James M. Hagood) ("It was obvious to me while I
was a federal employee that one did not enhance his federal career by report-
ing fraud or getting involved in actions to rectify civil fraud against the United
States.. .. ").
148. See Edward T. Ackerman, Note, A Partnership with the Government?:
How the Inclusion of Attorney Contingency Fees in a Plaintiffs Gross Income
Negatively Impacts Qui Tam Litigation, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 213, 230-31 (2004).
149. See, e.g., John T. Boese & Shannon L. Haralson, Courts Must Bar Qui
Tam Suits by Government Employees, 11 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER 1, 4 (1996);
Hanifin, supra note 41, at 611; Wallace, supra note 46, at 14; Johnston, supra
note 1, at 635-38; Kovacevic, supra note 48, at 638 (discussing concern about
federal employee conflicts of interest in qui tam suits); Theis, supra note 21, at
226.
150. See, e.g., Rothschild & Kim, supra note 26, at 505-06 (discussing fi-
nancial incentives).
151. Investigators may make minimal disclosures to the inspector general,
attorney general, or supervisors, in hopes that the DOJ does not file any ac-
tion. See id. at 514.
2010] GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE QUI TAM SUITS
employees who see their peers as overzealous in their efforts to
become qui tam relators.152
These commentators' arguments are unpersuasive. Since
the 1986 amendments to the FCA, not a single government
employee discovered fraud in the course his employment and
used that information to file a qui tam suit without first report-
ing that information to his supervisors.153 Additionally, Con-
gress has previously designed programs that give federal em-
ployees money for reporting fraud.154 For instance, 5 U.S.C.
§ 4512 grants an inspector general the authority to give em-
ployees whose "disclosure of fraud ... has resulted in cost sav-
ings" an award of one percent of the cost savings to the gov-
ernment or $10,000, whichever is less.155 Further, 5 U.S.C.
§ 4513 allows the President to pay up to $20,000 to any em-
ployee whose "disclosure of fraud" has resulted in "substantial
cost savings" to the government. 56 These programs do not ex-
clude federal employees, such as investigators, who have a spe-
cial duty to detect fraud.157 Indeed, Congress recognized that
such rewards are necessary to encourage government em-
ployees to come forward to report fraud.15 8
3. Now Is the Moment to Curb Fraud and Regain the Trust of
American People by Allowing Government Employees to Serve
as Qui Tam Relators
The United States is currently in the middle of an econom-
ic crisis and the government's budget deficits are at the highest
152. See Bullock, supra note 97, at 384-85.
153. Brief of Appellant at 31, United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc., 72 F.3d 740 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-15728), 1993 WL 13103212 ("[Be-
tween 1986 and 1993] there is not one reported instance of a government em-
ployee's discovering fraud in the course and scope of his employment and us-
ing that information to file suit without first reporting the fraud and diligently
attempting to have his or her superiors pursue the fraud according to regula-
tions."); see also United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493,
1495-96 (11th Cir. 1991) (Air Force attorney first reported fraud to superiors);
United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416,
1417-18 (9th Cir. 1991) (Army Corps of Engineers attorney first reported
fraud to supervisors).
154. See Hanifin, supra note 41, at 604--05.
155. 5 U.S.C. § 4512 (2006).
156. Id. § 4513.
157. See Hanifin, supra note 41, at 604-05.
158. See S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS ACT OF
1986, S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 4-5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5269-70 (discussing the MSPB survey of federal employees demonstrating
that many were afraid to report fraud).
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level ever. 15 9 To stimulate the economy, Congress and the Ob-
ama Administration passed the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act, "which provides $787 billion in tax cuts and fed-
eral spending to preserve and create jobs, assist those most
harmed by the recession, and reinvest in [the] . . . country."160
As a consequence of this legislation, the government is spend-
ing an exorbitant amount of money on contractors over a short
period of time.161 Unscrupulous government contractors will
use this opportunity to "exploit the system and criminally prof-
it."162 Fraud experts estimate the United States government
loses seven percent of revenues to waste or fraud, which is ap-
proximately $55 billion when applied to the $787 billion stimu-
lus package. 163 This Congress and the Obama Administration
have a unique opportunity to hold contractors accountable for
fraud perpetrated against the United States.
An effective way to accomplish this goal is to allow gov-
ernment employees to bring qui tam lawsuits. By granting
standing to government employees, the number of frauds
against the government will likely decrease and, with time,
public trust in government will strengthen. 164 Opponents may
criticize this argument because it fails to appreciate how many
qui tam actions will be brought by government relators and
159. See generally Carl Hulse, Senate Passes Spending Bill Amid Debate on
Raising Debt Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009, at A22 (discussing the deficit
and stimulus bill); David E. Sanger, A Red-Ink Decade, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,
2010, at Al ("[T]he projected deficit in the coming year [is] nearly 11 percent of
the country's entire economic output. . . . American deficits will not return to
what are widely considered sustainable levels over the next 10 years.").
160. Preventing Stimulus Waste and Fraud: Who Are the Watchdogs?:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111th
Cong. 4 (2009) [hereinafter Preventing Stimulus Waste and Fraud] (statement
of Rep. Towns, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform).
161. See id.
162. See Proposals to Fight Fraud, supra note 5, at 7 (statement of Rita
Galvin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Department of
Justice).
163. See Preventing Stimulus Waste and Fraud, supra note 160, at 4
(statement of Rep. Towns, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Govern-
ment Reform) ("Fraud experts estimate that U.S. organizations lose 7% of rev-
enues to fraud and waste. When applied to the stimulus package, that
amounts to a whopping $55 billion in American tax dollars potentially
wasted."). This is consistent with DOJ estimate that fraud drains one to ten
percent of the entire federal budget. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 3.
164. See Petty, supra note 96, at 876 ("On the whole, state and local gov-
ernments will be more cleanly run, and individuals will have more faith in
democracy because everyone is empowered and nearly everyone would be will-
ing to bring a qui tam action if they encountered public corruption.").
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whether those actions will be publicized. 165 Although these cri-
tiques may have some merit, the current economic situation
undermines their importance.166 Government employees have
information that could help the government recover billions of
dollars.167 In the current environment, allowing federal em-
ployees to initiate qui tam actions is a necessity.
At a recent hearing held by the Commission on Wartime
Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, a bipartisan commission
created to study defense contractor fraud, Senator Jim Webb
stated that there is an "urgent need right now" to try to combat
contractor fraud.s68 He argued that rampant fraud by contrac-
tors negatively affects public trust in government and public
perception of Congress. 169 Amending the FCA "offers an oppor-
tunity for the Government to win back the hearts and minds of
taxpayers who believe the Government does not care how tax-
payer dollars are spent."170 Allowing qui tam actions by public
employees will increase public trust in government and save
the government money.17'
165. Cf. Rothschild & Kim, supra note 26, at 505 ("Multi-million dollar re-
coveries against big name corporate defendants are always headline grab-
bers.").
166. See Chris Isidore, It's Official: Recession Since Dec. '07, CNNMO-
NEY.COM, Dec. 1, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/12/01/news/economy/recession/
?postversion=2008120115; see also News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
The Employment Situation-2009 (Jan. 8, 2010), at 7 tbl.C, available at http://
www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf. Forty eight states face budget defi-
cits in fiscal year 2010. ELIZABETH MCNICHOL & NICHOLAS JOHNSON, RECES-
SION CONTINUES TO BATTER STATE BUDGETS; STATE RESPONSES COULD SLOW
RECOVERY 3-4, 5 tbl.2 (2010), http://www.cbpp.org/files/9-8-08sfp.pdf. The
largest deficit belongs to California, which projects a $52 billion gap for the
2010 fiscal year. Id. at 5 tbl.2.
167. Cf. Rothschild & Kim, supra note 26, at 507 (suggesting that in-
creased awareness of the potential reward of qui tam actions will encourage
such lawsuits).
168. Senator Webb's Statement, supra note 95.
169. See id. ("Without it, without that kind of [public] trust, it impacts
every other thing we're trying to do and every piece of legislation that we vote
on.').
170. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT CORRECTION
ACT OF 2008, S. REP. No. 110-507, at 8 (2008).
171. See 2008 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 12 (statement of Sen. Ri-
chard Durbin, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("[T]he American public
would be less scandalized by the notion that a Federal employee might end up
with 10 percent or 20 percent of the outcome and find millions, if not billions of
dollars being saved from being defrauded."); Petty, supra note 96, at 876
("People will have more faith in a system that they feel they have more influ-
ence over, corrupt acts will be deterred as a result of the qui tam ac-
tions . . . .").
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This historic moment, combined with employees who are in
a distinctive position to ascertain the existence of fraudulent
contracts, provides strong arguments that government em-
ployees should be able to bring qui tam actions. If the govern-
ment holds contractors accountable, public confidence in the
government will increase. 172 Additionally, taxpayers will feel
secure knowing that if a corporation is defrauding the govern-
ment, the government is more likely to prosecute it for substan-
tial money damages. If Congress grants government employees
standing as relators, then contractors will be less likely to at-
tempt to defraud the government because they will know that
government employees would have a personal interest in disco-
vering their fraudulent acts.173 Overall, allowing government
employees to serve as qui tam relators will save the govern-
ment money and enhance the public's perception of the gov-
ernment. As such, it is imperative that Congress gives govern-
ment employees this much-needed power.
III. CONGRESS SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS
LEGISLATION GRANTING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
STANDING AS QUI TAM RELATORS
Even though the 1986 FCA amendments are ambiguous on
the issue of government employee relators,174 the current cir-
cuit split and Congressional bills on the subject raise its promi-
nence in the national discourse.175 By explicitly removing any
jurisdictional bar against government employees' ability to sue
under the FCA, the government will recoup money otherwise
unobtainable and deter contractors from overcharging the gov-
ernment for its services.176 Accordingly, Congress should enact
172. See S. REP. No. 110-507, at 8 ("[F]raud erodes public confidence in the
Government's ability to efficiently and effectively manage its pro-
grams.. . . [The FCA] offers an opportunity for the Government to win back
the hearts and minds of taxpayers who believe the Government does not care
how taxpayer dollars are spent.").
173. See Rothschild & Kim, supra note 26, at 507 ("Qui tam awards are
their own best advertisement. As more people become aware of the law, more
lawsuits follow.").
174. See Hargrove, supra note 75, at 65 (quoting Rep. Howard Berman).
175. See id. at 68-69 (describing different approaches to determining
whether federal employees can be qui tam relators).
176. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attor-
ney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law
Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 669-72 (1986)
(discussing private enforcement of law).
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a federal statute allowing all public employees to bring qui tam
actions under the FCA.
A. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT TO ALLOW
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE QuI TAMACTIONS, NOT THE COURTS
Though the Supreme Court could explore the issue by
hearing a case involving a government employee relator, the
best route to solve this problem is through Congress. Instead of
the courts trying to interpret the ambiguous language in the
federal FCA, Congress, through legislative action, can provide
specific language addressing when government employees will
qualify as relators. Courts could then consistently implement
Congress's vision for government employees. Such legislation
would harmonize the conflicting reasoning among the circuits
on this significant issue.
B. CONGRESS SHOULD USE THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
CLARIFICATION ACT OF 2009 AS A BLUEPRINT TO ADDRESS THE
ISSUE OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATORS
On February 24, 2009, Senator Grassley introduced the
False Claims Act Clarification Act of 2009.177 Under Grassley's
proposed Act, government employees may bring a qui tam ac-
tion based upon information learned in the course of their em-
ployment if (1) the employee first discloses the fraud to a su-
pervisor, an inspector general of the agency, or the Attorney
General, and (2) the employee waits eighteen months without
government action prior to bringing his lawsuit as a relator. 178
The Act also restricts a government employee from bringing a
FCA claim if the employee derived information for his case in a
criminal indictment or any ongoing criminal, civil, or adminis-
trative investigation.17 9 Further, the bill restricts government
employees, such as government auditors, investigators, or at-
torneys, from filing a qui tam action since these employees
have a duty to investigate fraud as part of their jobs.8o
Senator Grassley's bill provides key language that should
be included in any congressional amendment to the FCA. In-
177. See False Claims Act Clarification Act of 2009, S. 458, 111th Cong.
(2009). Senator Grassley was also a sponsor of the 1986 FCA amendments. See
Charles E. Grassley & Howard Berman, Letter to the Editor, Finding a Mid-
dle Ground in Qui Tam Suits, WASH. POsT, Feb. 2, 1992, at C6.
178. S. 458 § 3.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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deed, the proposal does not grant standing to federal employee
auditors, investigators, and attorneys, whose employment spe-
cifically includes a duty to report fraud. 181 These employees
have the most significant risk of a conflict of interest and, as
such, they should not be able to commingle their employment
responsibilities with the potential of private damage recov-
ery.182 Therefore, Grassley's Act effectively addresses the con-
cern that allowing government employees to serve as qui tam
relators will result in conflicts of interest.
Grassley's bill, however, should clarify some matters. First,
Congress should give government employees who do not have
fraud reporting responsibilities more immediate access to the
FCA's financial incentives to bring qui tam lawsuits. With
these employees, conflict of interest considerations are not as
significant.183 Allowing these employees to serve as qui tam re-
lators will motivate public employees to detect instances of
overcharging by contractors. 184 By allowing employees with no
fraud reporting responsibilities to file qui tam actions, Con-
gress will deter companies from attempting to defraud the gov-
ernment because they will fear repercussions.a1 8 Senator Grass-
ley's Act, which provides a blanket proscription of procedural
safeguards for all government employees, is not strong enough.
Rather, the amendment to the FCA should explicitly allow gov-
ernment employees without investigative duties to serve as qui
tam relators immediately.
Second, Congress should enumerate strict procedures for
former government auditors, investigators, and attorneys
whose job description specifically included investigating
181. Id.
182. See Bullock, supra note 97, at 387-89 ("[Ilt is important to establish
procedural safeguards to assure that the potentially conflicting interests of the
government and the government employee are both heard."); Grassley & Ber-
man, supra note 177.
183. See Grassley & Berman, supra note 177. ("[T]he government and tax-
payers can only benefit from the filing of a False Claims action [by a govern-
ment employee] that exposes fraud that would otherwise have gone undisco-
vered or unprosecuted."); see also Callahan, supra note 143, at 129
("Government employees who do not have specific anti-fraud responsibili-
ties . . . should be given more immediate access to the FCA's financial incen-
tives for providing information.").
184. See Bullock, supra note 97, at 387 (noting that government employee
relators may deter fraudulent conduct by contractors because they could no
longer rely on the "ineptitude or malaise of government employees in ferreting
out illegal activity"). See generally Grassley & Berman, supra note 177 (dis-
cussing interests of taxpayers).
185. See generally Grassley & Berman, supra note 177.
[ 94: 12391266
20101 GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE QUI TAM SUITS 1267
fraud. 186 Any amendment to the FCA should not encourage fed-
eral employees to quit so that they may immediately bring a
qui tam suit based on the information obtained in their gov-
ernment job.187 To ensure that government auditors, investiga-
tors, and attorneys cannot retire as a means to bypass any re-
strictions on their ability to serve as qui tam relators, the
amendment to the FCA must specifically prohibit government
auditors, investigators, and attorneys from serving as qui tam
relators for at least five years after they retire.188 This type of
prohibition will alleviate conflict of interest concerns 189 without
undercutting the ability of other government employees to
prosecute fraud.
Finally, the amendment should allow the DOJ to challenge
a government employee's right to sue if a compelling govern-
ment interest is at risk because of the qui tam action. 190 For
example, if the information obtained by the government em-
ployee would have a significant impact on national security,
then Congress should prohibit the employee from proceeding
with the lawsuit.191 Because this section of the bill would likely
be subject to controversy, Congress should hold congressional
hearings to debate this provision. By debating this issue, Con-
gress can determine what circumstances justify the DOJ to
challenge a government employee's right to sue under the FCA
when there is a compelling government interest at stake.192
186. See Callahan, supra note 143, at 130 (arguing that Congress should
limit the ability of former government employees to file qui tam actions based
on information gained during their tenure with the federal government).
187. See Petty, supra note 96, at 87(-71 (arguing that private citizens
should be allowed to bring qui tam actions against public officials for viola-
tions of criminal statutes).
188. See id. at 887-88 (suggesting that the pool of potential relators should
have appropriate limits). The False Claims Act Clarification Act of 2009 estab-
lishes a ten-year limitation period for bringing a civil action under the False
Claims Act. See False Claims Act Clarification Act of 2009, S. 458, 111th Cong.
§ 6 (2009).
189. See Bullock, supra note 97, at 387-89 ("It is only proper in the first
regard that the government have the opportunity to challenge the government
employee's right to sue if national security or some other compelling govern-
ment interest is threatened by the bringing of the qui tam action.").
190. See id. (suggesting a standard for assessing government employee qui
tam causes of action).
191. See id.
192. See George E. Connor & Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Deliberation: An Un-
timed Value in a Timed Game, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 315, 317-18
(Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 5th ed. 1993).
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Amending Grassley's bill in accordance with these sugges-
tions will serve as a key tool in saving the government money
and transforming public opinion of the U.S. government. Pass-
ing a bill with the proposed suggestions confronts public policy
concerns because it requires government employees to first re-
port any suspected abuse to their superiors and does not allow
government employees whose jobs require them to investigate
fraud to file qui tam actions. At the same time, this bill gives
federal employees with no antifraud responsibilities access to
qui tam awards, allowing them to serve as a useful check on
contractors attempting to defraud the government. Accordingly,
passing Senator Grassley's bill with the suggestions proposed
above will deter contractors from defrauding the government
and increase public confidence in government.
CONCLUSION
Government employees should have standing to bring qui
tam actions as relators against contractors who commit fraud
against the government. Currently, the government does not
have enough resources to stop all fraud committed against it.
The FCA is a tool to help the government in this fight. Gov-
ernment employees are in a unique position to detect and ex-
pose fraud committed by government contractors and Congress
should explicitly grant government employees this ability. In-
deed, such actions serve the ultimate purpose of the FCA,
which is to combat fraud against the government.
The government should motivate these individuals to
detect fraud when it occurs and to stop it before it starts. Cur-
rently, public confidence in government projects is at an all
time low and headlines continue to flash across the nation's
newspapers exposing instances of government contractors de-
frauding the government by overcharging for services. To pro-
vide another level of deterrence and gain more funds for the
current budget deficits, Congress should enact a statute that
explicitly grants public employees standing in court to act as
relators. Allowing government employees the right to bring qui
tam actions will motivate these individuals to detect and report
fraud committed against the federal government while compen-
sating them for their efforts. The United States is fighting two
wars and holding off an economic collapse-now is the time to
embrace measures that will save the American taxpayer money
and augment the image of the U.S. government.
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